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EUR/PRA FOR ANITA FRIEDT, OSD/MD FOR PAUL IARROBINO, OSD/P  
FOR BRIAN GREEN, EUR/RPM

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TAGS: [NATO](#) [PREL](#) [MARR](#) [KCFE](#) [RU](#)  
SUBJECT: MISSILE DEFENSE: 9/25 EXECUTIVE WORKING GROUP-  
REINFORCED MEETING READOUT

Classified By: DCM Richard Olson for reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S) Summary: In the September 25 Executive Working Group-Reinforced (EWG-R) meeting, the NATO International Staff agreed to prepare a draft report in response to the Riga missile defense tasking for the October 24-25 NATO Defense Ministerial. The U.S. informed Allies that it is seeking a political decision to pursue territorial missile defense at the Bucharest Summit (April 2-4). Allies did not react to our proposal in the EWG-R. In a prior bilateral meeting, the German delegation noted our proposal will be difficult to achieve. In a separate trilateral meeting, the Czechs and Poles offered full support. The French have not yet formulated a position on our proposal. Going forward, we will need to focus our efforts on breaking down German resistance through regular contacts both in the NAC and in Berlin. End summary.

IS FINALLY AGREES TO CARRY OUT RIGA TASKING  
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¶2. (S) During the September 25 Executive Working Group-Reinforced (EWG-R) meeting, the NATO International Staff (IS) agreed to prepare a draft report on territorial missile defense (MD) to be presented at the October 24-25 Defense Ministerial in Noordwijk. This report is intended to be a first step in responding to the Riga Summit tasking that the EWG-R examine the political and military implications of MD prior to a NATO decision on whether to pursue such a capability. The IS will also use the report as the basis for the February 2008 "comprehensive report" to the NAC which was tasked at NATO's June 2007 Defense Ministerial.

¶3. (S) During the September 25 EWG-R meeting, the NATO International Staff (IS) agreed to address the unfulfilled Riga tasking on territorial missile defense, with the intent of submitting an interim report at the October 24-25 Defense Ministerial in Noordwijk. The IS will use this product as the basis for the February 2008 "comprehensive report" to the NAC that was tasked at the June 07 Defense Ministerial.

U.S. WANTS POLITICAL DECISION ON MD AT BUCHAREST  
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¶4. (S) The U.S. informed Allies that it wanted Heads of State and Government to make a political decision to pursue a territorial missile defense capability at the Bucharest Summit, regardless of whether the EWG (R) has completed analyzing all of the details associated with territorial MD. The U.S. argued that a high level political decision to pursue missile defense can be made without having determined all of the details about architecture, operations, and other issues that can be resolved once a political decision is made. The U.S. pointed to its own decision to field its own territorial defense prior to making key decisions about what the system would look like and how it would operate. (Note: NATO's decision to proceed with the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense Program was also made in this way. End note.)

BUT KEY ALLIES NEED CONVINCING  
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¶5. (SBU) Although Allied reaction to the U.S. position was muted at the table, with Germany stressing the need to keep examining the many different taskings, privately Allies have been more forthcoming in their views. In a private meeting preceding the EWG-R, the Germans reacted negatively, pointing out the difficulties with reaching an agreement on MD by Bucharest. The Poles and Czechs, however, have told us they support our position. French representatives have indicated that they are in a "listening mode" until the conclusion of a defense "white paper" expected in the spring of 2008.

¶6. (S) Comment: Per conversations with the Allies and the International Staff, it is likely that the most significant "push back" to a Bucharest decision to pursue territorial MD will come from Germany. At this point, the Germans are unwilling to support a political decision on NATO MD without

a formal NATO determination regarding the system details and its possible impact on wider non-proliferation efforts. We will need to pursue senior-level discussions with the Germans - both at the NAC and bilaterally - to convince them to drop their resistance. At the moment the French are presenting a more neutral stance, as they re-evaluate their position on MD in light of their recent change of government. Bringing the French on board is likely to depend on how strong an MD deliverable the U.S. proposes. They will be more inclined to support a decision to pursue an MD system that involves a minimum of programmatic detail. We should engage them on MD as frequently as possible, particularly in capital.

¶7. (S) Comment Continued: We assess that there are two prerequisites needed to enable a political decision on MD at Bucharest. The first- an updated joint missile threat assessment- has just been completed and points out that WMD and missile-related technologies are becoming more readily available. The second- an updated NATO MD feasibility study by the conference of National Armament Directors- should be completed in January. End Comment.

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